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SETTLER IDEOLOGY AND AFRICAN UNDERDEVELOPMENT 
IN POSTWAR RHODESIA
D. G. CLARKE
A largely ignored aspect of underdevelopment in Rhodesia, which plays 
a crucial role in legitimating the dominance, policies and status of the ruling 
group in the economic structure, is the conception, construction and trans­
formation of ideology. By ideology is meant what Plamenatz has called the 
‘sets of ideas or beliefs or attitudes characteristic of a group’.' The group 
whose ideology is being examined here is essentially, though not exclusively, 
the white community’s whose ideas, beliefs about and attitudes towards black 
economic structures, enterprise and labour have created an ideology, some­
times unsophisticated and in other instances sophisticated, which has been 
readily expounded to ‘explain’ African underdevelopment in Rhodesian 
society.
It will be a thesis advanced here that these ideological tenets have been, 
and still are, common to most whites in Rhodesia, that they concern economic 
issues which are important to the white minority, and have served the 
functional purpose of legitimating privilege and providing an explanation for 
co-existent development and under-development in an increasingly class 
stratified socio-economic structure. It will also be argued that the ideology 
held by whites has in the main been a class ideology, viz., it can be distin­
guished from the ideology of other classes in significant ways; and that, 
whilst essentially capitalist in origin, this ideology has important components 
in its make-up which derive from the specific historical and contemporary 
settler colonial situation. The contrived ideology has been a necessity to the 
governing class and has served (at times) various purposes. It has provided 
a part justification in formulating economic policies, for designing economic 
structures in the way in which they have been formed and maintaining 
various discriminatory institutional arrangements. The ideology has also 
provided a pseudo-authoritative rationalization of the status quo and attempts 
have been made to use these ideological tenets to provide a veneer of quasi­
respectability for, in some cases, paternalist capitalism and, in other instances, 
for maintaining dependency and underdevelopment in various semi-feudal 
economic structures. An important aspect of this ideology has been its pro­
pensity to direct attention away from the institutional structure as a con­
tributory cause of Rhodesian underdevelopment. In particular, this has 
manifested itself in various forms of racism in attempts to explain black 
poverty as a result of human-specific characteristics ‘peculiar (unfortunately) 
to the African population’.
Once these ideological foundations are accepted — as they have been 
by most whites — a particular view of Rhodesian society is fostered in 
which under-development comes to be regarded as a result of factors outside 
die realm of social control and of basically non-materialist origin. In this 
regard, the ‘religion of the market’—with discussion on the forces of supply 
and demand weighing heavily—conveniently provides the ‘magic box’ out 
of which ‘casual’ explanation is produced. Typically, little or no attention 
is given to the institutional structure within which these ‘forces’ must operate, 
or, if not thus ignored, the institutional framework is invested with the
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seemingly ordained property of unchangeability; and thus the mystifying 
picture of the ‘forces’ of the market, wildly determining all in a vacuum, like 
the (almost) extra-terrestial ‘Invisible Hand’ of a vulgarized Smithian 
economics, is perpetuated.
This particular ‘market mentality’ and the institutional structure it 
constructs, together with an ideology which suggests that the real causes of 
African underdevelopment are predominantly internal to the psyche, make-up, 
ways, behaviour, tradition and culture of the African, externalizes the origins 
of inequality from itself, on the one hand — by absolving itself of any 
responsibility for ‘directing and structuring’ the alignment of market forces 
—while, on the other hand, it attributes this causal responsibility almost 
entirely to the subjects of underdevelopment. From this philosophical stand­
point, little can be done to alter what is conceived of as an original and 
endemic state of underdevelopment, which is (mysteriously) unrelated to 
development elsewhere in the economic structure. Gradualism, long-term 
evolution, luck and fortuitous circumstance become the watchwords of 
(hopefully) potential progress in this situation. Little can be done in the 
interim except wait.
It is the ideological fabric which makes up part of this embracing 
conceptual scheme that will be examined here, firstly in its more populist 
forms, as evidenced through various official, governmental and day-to-day 
statements taken variously from the 1940-72 period, and secondly, in the 
more professionalized (academic) constructs of some contemporary sociolo­
gists, economists and social scientists whose common views broadly suggest 
a ‘cultural-theoretic’ explanation of inequality, poverty and under-development 
in Rhodesia. This ideology will only be examined in respect of three major 
classes in black society — workers, peasants and black capitalists — though 
more encompassing views, or attitudes towards, and beliefs about the African 
are also relevant and will be incorporated.
THE AFRICAN
The crudist form of racist ideology concerned the African — a simple 
stereotyped individual of easy persuasion, defective mental faculties and 
slothful indolence. As the Minister of Native Affairs — a man traditionally 
invested with the wisdom of knowing the African — put it in 1942, in giving 
a reason why the Compulsory (Native) Labour Act should be introduced 
and reliance should not be placed on the ‘voluntary system’ (allowing wages 
to rise and so attract labour supplies); ‘the voluntary system is absolutely 
inadequate . . . one can well understand that that would be the case, because 
the native is essentially slow to make up his mind’.2 In general terms, the 
African was regarded as being deficient in intelligence, this being rationalized 
by liberal critics of government into an argument claiming that ‘we expect 
too much intelligence and understanding from the native’.3 Parliamentarians 
were reminded regularly about this particular ‘fault’: ‘we must not forget 
that the mind of the local African with a few exceptions is undeveloped, and 
I suggest for consideration that he needs a certain amount of direction such 
as a European child has to have’.4 Hence this speaker’s advocacy of the 
institution of a government sponsored Native Labour Supply Commission in 
1946 to recruit foreign labour — after all, the locals just were not up to it. 
Also, it was recognized, some locals were more deficient than others: ‘in 
addition to that, there are many natives who are certainly below the normal
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intelligence and so on, and to them also (as to child labour) the minimum 
wage (should) not apply’.5 The African was ‘not as far advanced as the 
European’.® He had a low mentality, which in part accounted for his weakness 
of succumbing to ‘all sorts of mischief’.7 Agitators would arouse him, mislead 
him and spur him on, making trouble where none existed. For this reason, 
amongst others, African unionization could not be permitted in 1947 and a 
paternalist, more embracing, control system of Labour Boards was estab­
lished to ‘manage’ the African worker’s problems. This need for paternalist 
guidance was even recognized by solid white labourites who thought it proper 
to give ‘sympathetic consideration to those of an inferior race’.8 On top of 
this, the inferior African was really alike a wayward child: he needed 
guidance, supervision and above all discipline. This was convenient. The 
‘superior’, skilled, more advanced whites were (luckily) in a position to 
provide this ‘missing ingredient’, though of course selective use would also 
be made of ‘boss boys’ to control workers by proxy where white manpower 
was limited or funds were scarce. This was all part of the white man’s burden, 
a ‘responsibility for the native (to) guide him justly and correctly as far as 
we can’.9 To this end forced labour was regarded as ‘in no way derogatory 
to that’.10 Nonetheless, at least some saw this as guiding the African ‘with 
a rope around his neck’." Government spokesmen over-rode these chilling 
complaints through various appeals to the civilizing mission of colonial 
expansion: ‘Possibly we have been sent here by Providence in an endeavour 
to uplift the black races in this part of the continent’." The mission was also a 
special one because, after all, ‘generally speaking the Mashona in this country 
is far inferior to the native in that part of Africa’ (West Africa).'2 Better, 
then, to have compulsory rather than a voluntary labour system, because 
one could not get the ‘boys’ to do in 8 hours work which they were supposed 
to do in 12 hours between sunrise and sunset. This was ‘quite impossible, 
especially on farms’. '3 With this particularly unfavourable labourer, specific 
injunctions were required to see that the job was done properly. They had 
to be told what to do. And, like children, the ‘boys’ (sometimes referred to 
as ‘adult boys’ or ‘fully grown boys’) needed guidance and constant super­
vision.'4 Indeed, this was to be ‘good’ for them: ‘The effect of getting them 
out to work will I believe mean that later on they will come out voluntarily’.15 
Further, the Africans, or some of them, were eventually to see the benefit 
of forced labour: ‘I would point out that a lot of the Africans conscripted 
under the Act will receive a tremendous benefit by virtue of the fact that 
they are conscripted.’16 ‘Loafers’ would be weaned from their wasteful ways 
and the ‘dignity of labour’ would be inculcated into them — for the benefit 
of all and the satisfaction of the common good. In any event, they too were 
citizens of Empire and were not only expected to pay allegiance to it, but 
were willing to do so: ‘I believe we are fortunate in the fact that the natives 
are loyal; they are prepared to give their loyal support to the Empire in 
her time of need.’17
THE AFRICAN WORKER
Whilst general stereotyped views existed about the African, a whole 
separate but integrated ideology has grown up about the African worker. 
Whites knew that blacks were intellectually inferior, but that was not sufficient 
to explain why the African would not work — it only accounted for his 
inability to advance, to perform particular types of work, and to meet
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specific occupational requirements.
Another theory was therefore required. It was found conveniently in 
the moral laxity of African society and in the general propensity for Africans 
to ‘loaf’. Hence, there grew up the theory of the (African) loafer.
The moral backwardness of Africans was something deeply ingrained, 
perhaps unchangeable. Even economic progress would not raise or change 
their morals.18 It was recognized that at root the labour supply shortage 
experienced continuously in various low-wage industries — particularly 
plantations — was somehow related to deep psychological propensities within 
the African himself: ‘we will have to get right down and change the native 
himself before the (labour supply) problem will be solved.’19 And this was 
the liberal hope. The rest implicitly accepted that really this was impossible, 
a daydream. Africans had come from a state of idleness. The mission of 
the liberal colonist was to rescue him from it: ‘it is . . . not in the long term 
interests of our African brethren that they should be left in the state of 
idleness in which they are today.’20 This was 1948. Even 58 years of coloniza­
tion, urging, enticing, persuading and compulsory labour had not apparently 
fully worked. More was needed. But in the interim foreign labour—which 
somehow was more willing, indeed better—would be required. The first 
principle of ‘native affairs must be to inculcate into the African the idea that 
labour is the lot of man and that only by labour can he improve his position 
and only by labour can he live’.21 The African must not be encouraged ‘to 
remain indolent and to live a happy-go-lucky life, no matter how pleasant 
it sounds, because ultimately it is fatal’.22
The theory of the loafer served a variety of purposes: it ‘explained’ the 
persistent labour shortage on farms and on mines; it provided a rationalization 
for importing ‘boys’ from outside the country; it attempted (not always 
successfully) to draw attention away from the wage structure and incentives 
for peasant labourers to seek employment; it provided the basis for influx 
control policy in the towns and for creating a labour supply mechanism for 
the plantation economy; it legitimated the idea that many Africans in urban 
areas were really ‘vagrants’. The theory had, and indeed still has, various 
strands. All Africans had a strong propensity to loaf. Thus the Minister of 
Labour Social Welfare and Housing noted in 1959, whilst introducing the 
so-called non-racial Industrial Conciliation Bill, that ‘The indigenous 
population had never had any real need, desire or interest for work’.23 
They had experienced a ‘background of centuries of ignorance and indolence 
which blunted any incentive to economic betterment’.24 Hence it was not 
surprising that there existed many loafers and ‘won’t works’. Work, after all, 
was only a recent phenomenon as far as the African was concerned: ‘it is 
historically true that the native really did not get down to doing any work at 
all until he discarded his skins and put on clothes,’ noted the Prime Minister 
in 1948.25 Work was essentially a post-1890 phenomenon.
But not all would succumb to the various pressures to work or so gladly 
take up the numerous offers of employment that were available. Whilst such 
persons were in abundance, they created particular problems when they 
congregated in the white towns, causing trouble, ‘living off their wits’, 
sponging on the ‘honest’ Africans and indulging in and promoting all sorts 
of vices. Indeed, the loafers were often blamed for fomenting the ‘General 
Strike’ of 1948. The solution was (relatively) simple: ‘I feel that the Govern­
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ment should at this time try to clear out some of the loafers from the towns. 
It would not only in a small measure alleviate the acute (labour) shortage 
in the outside districts, but it would help to avoid some of those unpleasant 
situations which develop from time to time.’26 In the mid*1940’s the farm 
‘labour shortage’ was worrying both farmers and government. The Com­
pulsory Labour Act had been repealed since it had been a war measure 
and its justification had fallen away. New labour supply mechanisms were 
needed. Policy changes also required a new theoretical background perspective 
and justification. The theory of the (urban) loafer was convenient for this 
purpose. In 1948 a motion on the labour shortage was introduced into the 
House of Assembly calling for immediate action by government to rigidly 
enforce all existing relevant laws in order ‘to remove unemployed natives 
from urban areas’.27 The motion was put and agreed to. It was claimed that 
there were several thousand loafers in Salisbury alone, itself evidence of 
the Africans (by now) well known love of leisure and disinclination to work. 
Housing controls, pass laws, police surveillance and other measures were 
suggested to deal with the problem. The liberal perspective was that ‘the 
loafers in the big cities especially should be put away’.28 The more reactionary 
viewpoint added another twist to the (popular) theory of the loafer: ‘If we 
are going to enforce laws to remove these (loafers) from the towns, the fact 
that they are sent back into the country will not change their habits.’29 In 
short, once a loafer, always a loafer: ‘If a native is a loafer in town he will 
be a loafer for ever.’30 Part of the problem was seen to be the ease with which 
the loafers could loaf: ‘It is far too easy for loafers to loaf.’31 In more recent 
times the ‘loafer’ has been transformed into the ‘vagrant’. However, the 
concept has remained the same. Only more sophisticated language has been 
substituted and a slightly more intellectually presentable case has been pro­
pounded for why the ‘vagrants’ ought to be removed from the urban areas. 
As a result, the Vagrancy Act of 1960 has been applied, along with other 
controls, and has been extended in scope and application in the 1973 amend­
ment which widened the definition of a vagrant considerably.
A more sophisticated variant of the loafer has been the theory of the 
black ‘target worker’ which explains African labour supply responsiveness 
in terms of a ‘limited wants’ thesis which argues that Africans only seek 
jobs for the purpose of securing specific amounts of income, sufficient to 
cover the costs of particular items or needs. Once this wage or income is 
obtained, the target becomes satisfied and the worker withdraws from the 
labour market. This theory is closely linked to, indeed it is part of, the theory 
of the backward bending supply curve of effort which it was argued applied to 
the African; ‘In fact, generally, if you increase the natives wages you get less 
work’.32 Optimal labour policy therefore ought to be a low-wage policy, 
if only to save the African from his own irresponsibility: ‘I fear that any 
increase in native wages will mean that there will be more gambling and 
more native beer drinking unless there is more control over the native than 
we have today’.33 Low wages suitably laced with widespread control was 
the panacea for development. Moreover, it was a particularly coherent little 
theory. The Africans had few wants or needs. These could be too easily 
satisfied if wages rose. Keep wages down and ensure that labour supplies 
are maximized. Some settlers had even calibrated the relationship between 
increased wages and the ensuing fall off in effort: ‘If you pay (the) native 
double the wages he is accustomed to now he will just work 50 per cent
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less than he does now.’34 The reason for this, in part, lay in African arrogance: 
‘invariably it means that by increasing native wages he does less work because 
he thinks he is indisipensible.’35 Extra wages would be disastrous because 
‘the natives are great gamblers and many (spent) practically all their wages 
in gambling.’36 It was conveniently overlooked that this was inconsistent 
with the pure theory of the target worker, except insofar as the target was 
set by the desire to gamble a certain sum of money. Also, because the 
employers (generally) were thought to provide for all basic needs, the 
justification for wage increases simply fell away. ‘Rations’ were provided, 
accommodation made available and the cash wage was ‘pocket money’. At 
the end of the month the cash wage was ‘clear as all other expenses are 
paid, bar the clothes he wants to buy, by his employer’.37 Extra wages 
would simply be squandered. Indeed, the argument went, wages really did 
not matter: ‘The experience of many farmers is that it does not matter very 
much the rate of wage as long as the native is fed, housed and treated like 
a human being.’38 Equitable treatment would be a sufficient recompense for 
arduous labour because ‘you will find he is not so interested in the wages he 
(receives)’.39 Even if extra wages were not spent on drinking, gambling and 
having a jolly good leisurely time, ‘the native is a most wasteful individual. 
(Even if) he buys a blanket he will not look after it’.4° Better to save him 
from his folly. Indeed, remarked one farmer, with regard to housing, ‘I find 
my natives are perfectly satisfied with a well-built kaffir hut’.4' As regards 
food, ‘many natives like a good feed rather than an increase in wages’.42 
Hence, continuation of the ‘rations’ system, employer controlled housing and 
pocket-money-wage-policies would be adequate. There was no need to 
undermine these semi-feudal, long standing labour policies.
Another variant of the theory of the loafer concerned the reluctance of 
indigenous Africans to take work on plantations. Various explanations— 
other than those relating to the inadequate wage policy of the plantation 
economy — were offered for this. Local Africans were just ‘unwilling’ to 
do farm work, to get their hands dirty, even though, strangely enough, 
similar tasks would be performed by these same ‘loafers’ in the peasant 
economy. This was of course overlooked and instead employers cultivated 
the myth of the well-looked-after-farm-boy: ‘on the farms the natives get 
everything. And the money they get is completely free from all expenditure 
for themselves except of course luxuries and their annual hut tax.’43 Some 
believed natives would not work outside. Others blamed the labour shortage 
on education, agitators, and the old fail-back, the (local) African’s natural 
reluctance to do farm work.
Proposed solutions to this crisis in labour supplies varied: compulsory, 
forced labour was introduced, despite objections from a few ardent white 
laborites about tyranny, exploitation and slavery;44 a foreign contract labour 
system was begun; migrant labour agreements were entered into at govern­
mental level; one proposal suggested setting up a central labour agency to 
handle all labour contracts, to pay all Africans the same wage in order ‘to 
eliminate competition for labour by employers increasing wages’;45 suggestions 
were mooted to increase the supply of females into domestic work, so 
releasing males for the rest of the employer needs; farmers ‘offered to finance 
the capital outlays to recruit up to 2000 “boys” from Nyasaland provided 
the financiers received 50 per cent of the labour supply’;46 one bizarre pro­
posal was ‘to start establishing at once native peasants on the land, breeding
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up their families to be agricultural workers’ — and this from a member of 
the Rhodesian Native Labour Supply Commission;47 loafers were to be 
ferreted out of their urban hiding-places, despite the fact that a 1946 study 
in Salisbury showed that the loafer ‘element’ was a gross exaggeration because 
of 10 921 Africans examined only 176 were not on their ‘lawful business’;46 
it was suggested that the period of duration of validity of the urban pass 
be reduced, so enabling a quicker turnaround of Africans towards plantation 
employment; a slogan was suggested, to be given wide publicity in order to 
encourage the dis-hoarding of labour, which said: ‘Are the boys you employ 
really necessary?’;49 farmers were encouraged to ‘arrange some scheme of 
co-operation by sending their boys over to do a spot of work for a neighbour 
for a day or two’;50 Africans who owed tax but had left the colony, it was 
suggested, should be given dispensation from liability;51 and a motion in 
Parliament to introduce minimum wages, predictably, was defeated, not to 
reappear again for 25 years; the name of the Labour Supply agency set up 
by government was cited as the Labour Supply Commission and not Bureau 
following its predecessor (Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau 1903-33) 
‘because the word “bureau” is so offensive to the natives’.52
The ideology concerning African workers, cultivated by settlers and 
government alike, satisfied advocates of the status quo about the wisdom of 
their policies, the correctness of the economic structures so established, as well 
as their general benevolence. Africans had different needs from Europeans, 
and the latter knew these best. The ethos of the ‘civilizing mission’ of bringing 
labour to the indolent African transformed itself into providing the ‘guiding 
hand’, exercising ‘trusteeship’, and, more recently, into ‘responsible decision­
taking’ and providing the skills and ‘know-how’ for ‘modernization’. Whilst 
some ideologists were conscious of their role, some appear as having been 
blinded to this prospect as, for example, the ‘liberal’ Minister of Labour in 
the late 1950’s who, along with others, continued to speak of the Masters 
and Servants Act as essentially ‘non-racial’.53 Nonetheless, the ideology that 
had been built up over decades did not remain static. It changed and adapted 
itself to new circumstances and economic demands. Thus, following strikes 
and labour unrest in the late 1940’s and political agitation in the 1950’s, it 
was deemed desirable to incorporate Africans in industry under the Industrial 
Conciliation Act. A new ideological shift became necessary. Not all Africans 
now were irresponsible or unfit for unionism. Some were; but, to avoid them 
falling prey to agitators, controls were kept and steadily applied so that the 
nascent African unionist movement would always be manageable and under 
control.
THE AFRICAN PEASANT
Whilst much of the ideology concerning Africans has been about 
workers, various views about peasants have also held strong sway and have 
been important in providing the ideological underpinnings of policies towards 
‘African’ agriculture, policies which over the decades have resulted in the 
(relative) underdevelopment of the peasant economy and its displacement 
as capitalist penetration has increased. The cruder ideologies about the 
peasantry basically claimed that the peasants experienced an easy, lazy life, 
a  life of few worries and general indolence. The peasant economy has been 
^regarded as a wasting asset, inhabited by a privileged and pampered section 
Itrf the society: ‘natives are able at this moment (1942) to live at their kraals
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on land that is reserved for them free of charge.’54 They too were essentially 
‘loafers’ and had lots of spare time: ‘The native could very well do three 
times as much work without suffering any hardship at all.’55 It was even 
believed possible to forcibly withdraw peasant labour supplies from the 
peasant economy with such a resource re-allocation having no effect on 
peasant welfare: ‘I  do not believe that the calling up of boys during those 
periods (during the reaping period) would have any real effect on production 
in their own reserves.’56 At this time, and late into the 1960’s, officials cul­
tivated the view that their existed widespread disguised unemployment in 
peasant agriculture. Peasants would be better off at real work — in mines and 
on the plantations, especially. They were also a political threat, of a type: 
‘We are allowing them to live in a communistic state and they will be ripe 
for the seeds of the very doctrine we do not want them to espouse.’57 If only 
the peasants could be turned into capitalists, with individual ownership of 
land and property. In the light of more recent, post-1965 community develop­
ment policies, emphasizing community ownership and decision, the turn­
around in perspective has been almost complete, though in recent times this 
has been necessary to establish a low-cost social security policy for the 
peripheral groups in rural society. Nonetheless, in the 1940’s, peasant struc­
tures needed to be done away with, at least in so far as they hindered the 
free flow of labour supplies. Various myths were cultivated to provide 
justification for this: ‘In his life in the reserve there is a minimum of 
responsibility.’58 The peasant male particularly, the labour ‘unit’ in demand 
in the capitalist sector, had a life of luxury and ease which he ought to be 
rescued from: ‘They have lived in their kraals and the women have done the 
work when they have got above the juvenile stage, and actually it will not 
at all be a bad thing for those natives to be turned out to work for a period’.59 
The rural life of the African, so long idyllic and blissful, could not last in the 
face of advancement: ‘the African cannot expect to go on much longer living 
in the reserves. It is not in his interests to do so.’60 Peasants ought to be 
proletarianized, for their own good: ‘to leave him there and to encourage 
him to stay there is inimical to his own interests.’61
Not only were the peasantry dominated by the centre but their status 
in the periphery-centre situation was like that of a child-parent relationship. 
The creation of labour supplies was thus regarded as an essential part of a 
maturation process. In order to legitimate this process, and provide a 
justification for not developing the peasant economy, a theory had to be 
created. This theory had a number of tenets, many of which still pertain in 
the 1970’s and are applied not only to peasants, but also to African workers 
in the rural and urban sectors. This theory rested upon notions of a back­
ward bending supply curve of effort in respect of price incentives to peasant 
producers; on the ‘irrationality’ of peasant asset-holding policies in respect 
of cattle, the principal form of stock-holding; and the ‘unwillingness’ of 
peasants to seek wage employment on the farms and mines. Belief in these 
tenets implied various optimal development strategies: if peasant responsive­
ness was price-neutral, various forms of ‘forced’ labour were better than 
price policies to bring about an increase in output or effort; irrational 
cattle-holding policies could only really be altered through compulsory de­
stocking which would therefore be in the peasants’ own interest; and foreign 
labour should be imported to overcome ‘labour shortages’ created by the 
indolence of unwilling indigenous peasants. Above all, the true believers
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judged peasant economic policy by impossible standards, and within the 
structures of their own creation, ignoring the important differences between 
the peasantry and the capitalist centre. This meant penalizing peasants for 
‘perceived’ differential performance in a system which was designed to 
displace the peasant mode of production and induce a proletarianization 
process. Denied the means to achieve economic ends, the peasantry were 
castigated for not being able to meet capitalist desires, objectives and levels 
of development. The ideology was well expressed in the Second Report of 
the Development Co-ordinating Commission in 1949: ‘Sudden and sub­
stantial raising of price, even of one commodity, may be making it easier 
to win a subsistence from the land, induce less instead of greater effort. 
Risk of this is especially great where the Native population has wide freedom 
to ensure subsistence by various combinations of wage employment and 
working (or half working) its own land.’62 Yet even the records of Chief 
Native Commissioners in the 1940’s provided the data to undermine this 
rationalization. Thus after the 1949 devaluation, which led to an increase 
in maize prices, the following was reported: ‘With the rise in maize prices 
following devaluation there was a sharp rise in the amount marketed and 
the figure rose from 388 726 bags in 1949 to 791 488 in 1950 . . .  It is quite 
obvious that the price incentive has stimulated maize production.’63 Yet, 
when producer levies were introduced for Africans around the same time, 
the disincentive effects were not considered to be powerful enough to cause a 
revision of the policy of taxing peasant production.
It was in respect of the ‘irrationality’ of peasant asset holding policy— 
‘the Africans inherent love of and attachment to cattle’—that the ideology 
of Rhodesian development policy was, and still is, strongest.64 In 1944 the 
Production and Trade Commission expressed the conventional ideology: 
‘Natives rarely follow economic principles in raising cattle, being content to 
sell a beast only when they need some money.’6S Even in this statement, 
however, can be found part of the answer to the Commisson’s problem, viz., 
that cattle, as wealth or assets, perform an important security function in a 
low-income society which tends to only release or liquidate these assets in 
time of need. The rising price of lobola, in terms of cattle, also raised fears 
in the Commission’s eyes: it would reduce marketed supplies, contribute to 
over-stocking and eventually lead to land deterioration. The Commission’s 
recommendations, aiming at the limitation of the size of each family’s herds 
and limitation or price control on the value of lobola contracts, struck at the 
very heart of peasant opportunities for capital accumulation and investment in 
peasant production. Destocking policies were opposed by peasants for this 
very reason, especially since cattle, which are in the nature of a producer 
good, yield future incomes and assets beyond their immediate current output.66 
In practice, of course, peasants were responsive to cattle prices as well as 
Ae effects of seasonality on the returns from grain production. Thus the 
Chief Native Commissioner had to report in 1942 that ‘The number (of cattle) 
aold to Europeans represents an increase of 19 407, and in view of the fact 
[that prices were generally somewhat higher, would seem to refute to some 
.extent the argument held in some quarters that in years of enhanced prices 
[the Native owner sells fewer cattle’.67 Indeed, the importance of the mix of 
jjjmce and seasonality in influencing asset sales patterns was strongly brought 
|put in the Chief Native Commissioner’s report for 1943: ‘Natives were freely 
(Selling at the current prices, and this, notwithstanding the fact that owing
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to the shortage of trade goods and the inadequacy of kraal food supplies, 
there is little incentive at the present time for an owner to turn his cattle 
into cash.’63 The comprehension of the peasant’s economic problem—income 
maximization within a context of security maximization, i.e., a weighted 
mix of economic objectives — was entirely outside the mind of policymakers, 
even though on occasions this relationship was recognized.69 Administrators 
generally ignored the context within which peasant production, marketing 
and survival had to occur.70 The holding of assets in the form of cattle was 
necessary for optimization of peasant output from available factor inputs. 
It was not a mystical policy pursued for love, passion or anything else.7' 
Pecuniary considerations in the long run played the dominant role. Cattle 
were important as a form of draught power for ploughing; they provided 
natural fertilization for crops; they were a low-cost source of meat-supplies; 
they performed an asset function as a store of value; in one sense they were 
also an insurance against inflation; and as a producer good, not simply a 
capital good, cattle were a valuable and lucrative investment. These factors 
were typically overlooked in the conventional wisdom and invalid com­
parisons, made between the marketed stock output of European and African 
agriculture, continued to perform the legitimating role of a policy designed 
to develop the former and not the latter. The myth of the gross inefficiency 
of the African peasant persisted.72
Ideological perfections of peasant economic abilities and behaviour 
have not changed much throughout the 1940-70 period, though the style of 
approach to the ‘management’ of the peasant problem did. Inefficiency and 
laziness was one such theme: ‘Early evidence suggested and later evidence 
fully confirmed that irresponsibility and undiscipline were prevalent among 
Natives. For reasons which will be given later, practical measures to remove 
or diminish these undesirable features became a major issue of our inquiry.’73 
The Chief Native Commissioner’s report of 1961 spoke of ‘a mass apathy 
or cultural resistance’.74 In more recent times this has been further legitimized 
by the ‘professionalization’ of cultural theoretic interpretations of peasant 
underdevelopment.75 Danckwerts, for instance, has argued the immutability 
of peasant culture to change and enable people living in it to acquire and 
effectively utilize modern technology.76 The culturalist case is also used in 
genetic terms, by influential decision-makers such as the Minister of Finance 
who in !968 argued as follows: ‘Hereditary characteristics of the rural African 
—and here I must generalize because there are always exceptions to the rule 
—intertia, a high leisure preference and a degree of want that is easily 
satisfied, are characteristics which can only inhibit efforts made to increase 
productivity.’77 Peasant underdevelopment was also thought to be causally 
connected to ‘a record of apathy amongst the tribesmen’.76 Peasants had 
limited wants it was believed because ‘the degree of felt need in the rural 
African (was) far lower than in more civilized peoples’.79 This cultural 
dualistic model of underdevelopment, with all its ideological trappings, found 
fertile soil in colonial Rhodesia and its underlying psychology has a long 
history in Rhodesia which has changed little in substance, though perhaps 
in rhetoric over the 1940-70 period.60 It imbued in administrators, the class 
of rural whites most directly in contact with the peasantry, a sense of satis­
faction with their efforts and even, as late as 1971, the Secretary for Internal 
Affairs could report, to his apparent satisfaction and without fear, at least 
as he saw it, of being contradicted by the historical record: ‘A final word of
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warning to those who continually shout that we must develop the tribal areas. 
I have heard this story for over forty years and have seen elsewhere the 
nugatory results of heeding these theorists who have persuaded various 
governments to pour millions into the bottomless African pit.’81 The fact 
of peasant poverty, however, could not be dismissed in reality as it had been 
in theory. A sufficiently powerful theory was needed to replace the obvious 
vision of reality — and so the myth of the content, but poor, peasant was 
assiduously cultivated. African peasants were stereotyped as true ‘loyalists’ 
and, in the days of pre-independent settler colonialism, were deemed to have 
a primary interest in even the royal trappings of Empire. Thus in 1947 the 
the Chief Native Commissioner reported that ‘The chief event of the year 
was the visit of Their Majesties the King and the Queen’.82 The whole 
African populace are reported to have been highly appreciative of the 
‘personal contact with the Royal party throughout the tour’.83 Only later 
in the same report it is recorded that the second major event of the year 
‘was the unprecedented drought’.84 Not only were peasants intensely loyalist, 
royalist and cheerful in the eye sof administrators.85 They were also ‘non- 
political’ in inclination and did not take any interest in active politics either 
during the war period or in the period of Federalization of the economies of 
Nyasaland with Southern and Northern Rhodesia.86 Contented with their lot, 
African peasants were perceived of as essentially ‘happy’ even — as some 
have claimed — the ‘happiest Africans in the world’.87 In this fashion, an 
ideology for under-development contributed to the development of Rhodesian 
ideology.
THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF POPULIST IDEOLOGY
The aforegoing has dealt with general views of development ideology 
in Rhodesia. As important are the more ‘profesisonal’ perspectives, particularly 
academic theories, which express elements of these populist views in a more 
coherent fashion. Academic views may legitimate the more popular ideological 
tenets, lend respectability and authority and even provide a dynamic element 
insofar as the academic theses lead popular opinion in certain directions.
In this section, the views of a cultural-theoretic school will be examined, 
their model contrasted with the aforegoing populist ideology, and some 
criticisms offered concerning the cultural-theoretic interpretation of under­
development in Rhodesia.
The ‘cultural-theoretic’ model is here used as a generic term to refer 
to a set of theses closely akin to the famous Boeke theory of cultural 
dualism.88 This latter theory sought to explain the existence and process of 
dualistic underdevelopment in (Eastern) society as a function of attitudinal 
and behavioral patterns which inter alia characterized peasant economies. 
These are typified by the ‘limited wants’ thesis (i.e., the backward bending 
supply curve of effort), and absence of risk-taking and capitalistic enterprise, 
low aspirations and limited time-horizons, a lack of organizational com­
petence and technological backwardness. The essence of these theses, taken 
together in Boeke’s dualistic framework, was that cultural perspectives 
determined economic advancement. The latter condition would thus have to 
await cultural change, viz., attitudes, behavioural patterns and culture 
generally were responsible for (dualistic) underdevelopment. Much depends 
on what is meant by culture. This analysis will treat ‘cultural factors’ as a
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rubric which refers to what M. J. Herskovits and W. R. Bascom have called 
‘the way of life of a people . . . their traditional behaviour, in a broad sense, 
including their ideas, acts and artefacts’.89 It is the essence of this definition, 
as Patel has pointed out, that culture is learned; and what has been learned 
can be modified through further learning processes.90
The ‘cultural-theoretic’ model has been applied to underdevelopment 
in Rhodesia by a number of writers who have sought to explain the differential 
economic position of Black and White in Rhodesia in strong culturalist 
terms. Reader, for instance, has argued that ‘Europeans do not acquire their 
occupational expertise so much from their formal education as from the 
general cultural milieu in which they are reared. Not only are they exposed 
to western technology from the earliest possible moment, but they grow up 
in an atmosphere of a profit-maximising, production-oriented, monetary 
culture’.9' In short, they are born capitalists. Whites, it is argued, acquire 
their skills from birth and almost ‘unconsciously from growing up in a 
European environment’.92
Reader typologises African and European cultural values using polar 
types to represent each.93 Africans, it is suggested, have an agricultural 
time-sense oriented to the slow rhythm of the seasons; they use simple hand 
technologies and lack a quality sense; communal attitudes to property are 
strongly held and services are rendered without expectation of immediate 
return; Africans have personalized relationships in the main, primarily in 
the kinship and not the economic field; communal action is the norm, so 
discouraging personal initiative which is regarded as abnormal; African 
loyalty and morality only operates within the social group and all outsiders 
may be exploited or disregarded; Africans appeal to supernatural causation 
in all situations which are not under cultural control; they are collectively 
accountable and refer back all their reports to their kinsmen or senior 
spokesmen; also, should they operate outside the traditional context, there is 
a tendency to over-individualisation, or anticipatory exploitation, allowing 
one to legitimately take for oneself all that previously had to be shared in 
a communal context. The parallels between these views and populist ideology 
in the 1940’s-1960’s as well as in contemporary times is sufficiently clear as 
not to require detailed comments.
The contrast drawn between the African cultural type and the European 
cultural type is striking. The latter group has an industrial time-sense and 
treats time as an accountable commodity; theirs is a machine technology and 
they have high quality finish expectations; individualistic and exclusive rights 
over property and services are guarded by severe and enforceable legal sanc­
tions; predominantly impersonal relations occur in a sophisticated economic 
system; Europeans also possess mental flexibility and personal problem solving 
is accentuated; their morality is impartial and their dealings are honest, 
especially in professional matters; they adopt a scientific and empirical 
approach in all matters; Europeans accept personal responsibility in law for 
their own actions; finally, they have a sense of compromise or realization 
with experience that social contract prevails in which all may have some if 
none takes all.
Two other proponents of the ‘cultural-theoretic’ model in Rhodesia are 
Danckwerts and Sadie.94 The former has attempted to explain the competitive 
weaknesses of the peasant economy whilst the latter has argued a culturalist
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interpretation of the weaknesses of black capitalism. The Danckwerts argu­
ments have also been applied to the category of high level manpower in the 
Rhodesian labour market in a recent study on Black graduate manpower 
supply and demand.95 (I shall refer to Danckwerts’ study on the peasant 
economy as Danckwerts I and the latter theses as Danckwerts II.)
In Danckwerts I it is argued that ‘economic development depends on 
technological development and cannot be achieved without it’.96 And the 
rate of technological development, according to Danckwerts, depends upon ‘the 
willingness and ability of the population to sustain technological advance’.95 
Technological progress is therefore socially determined. It is not a function 
of technological diffusion from the centre of the periphery. Rather, technology 
is seen as being ‘culture-bound’, both in origin and utilization. Thus 
Danckwerts asserts that African culture ‘lacks the scientific and empirical 
approach on which modem production is based’.99 Africans, it is argued, are 
‘ill equipped to assess the relationship of cause and effect’;100 and, instead, 
seek explanation in terms of a complex ‘system of beliefs’.101 These traditional 
beliefs are woven into ‘the whole fabric of tribal culture . . . (which) means 
that members of such societies may be unable to increase their scientific 
competence simply because they cannot discard the shackles of their tradi­
tional beliefs’.102 The Danckwerts I thesis may be summed up briefly; African 
culture is non-scientific; scientific rationality is a pre-requisite of technological 
advancement; technological progress determines economic development. This 
‘vicious circle’ ensures underdevelopment. Hence it is not surprising that the 
tenor of Danckwerts’ arguments confirm Boeke’s statement that ‘We shall 
have to accept dualism as an irretrievable fact’.108
In Danckwerts II culturalist assumptions are extended to the labour 
market for graduate manpower in an attempt to explain the differential 
distribution of Black and White graduates in the occupational structure. In 
general, Danckwerts discounts discrimination as an adequate explanation of 
differential performance in the graduate labour market. Employer behaviour, 
Danckwerts argues, ‘may be a reasoned differentiation based on assessments 
of the chances of African graduates’ ability to make a success in the type of 
work associated with graduates’.104 Ignoring the question begged by the 
distinction drawn between ‘discrimination’ and ‘reasoned differentiation’, 
Danckwerts applies culturalist assumptions and extrapolations to explain 
differential racial competitiveness between Black and White graduates. 
Danckwerts II is wholly coterminous with Reader’s arguments about the 
economic determinacy of cultural differences.105 In any event, Reader’s 
theses are closely related to Danckwerts I, and the latter’s theoretical position 
is somewhat more polarized towards the less qualified type of ‘cultural 
theoretic’ model. Most of the arguments put forward in Danckwerts I are 
given a more articulate airing by Reader. However, similar views and assump­
tions pervade both analyses. Both are solidly ground in the Boeke tradition 
of socio-cultural dualistic analysis.
In Sadie it is argued that ‘economic development is fundamentally a 
function of the religious, social and cultural values of a society and the 
psychological traits of its members, which together constitute a way of life’.106 
Sadie offers as a datum the thesis that a ‘study of the Bantu peoples of 
Africa reveals the absence at this stage of most of those elements which are 
conclusive to economic development as an endogenous process’.107 In par­
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ticular, Sadie believes African culture to be antinimous to the development 
of entrepreneurship and in consequence he recommends that Rhodesia relies 
for this factor input ‘upon an adequate supply of European population’.'08 
This argument forms a fundamental premise of Sadie’s planning advice which 
advocated greater white immigration and a policy focus on generating 
employment opportunities outside the peasant sector.. The rationale for this 
latter approach was also founded on culturalist assumptions: ‘It appears to 
be much easier, in fact, to transform tribesmen from subsistence plotholders 
into efficient industrial labourers than into productive farmers’.'09 Put another 
way, the proletrianization of the African peasantry was deemed to be easier 
and preferable to attempts to develop the peasant economy. The significance 
of this choice will be discussed more fully in a later section."0
From the above brief synopses of the postulates of three principal pro­
ponents of the cultrualist school, it is apparent that the authors believe their 
model to be applicable throughout the range of the Rhodesian economic 
structure, even though individual authors may have confined themselves to 
advocating the ‘cultural theoretic’ explanation in selected situations. It may 
be further argued that many of the premises of culturalist theorists are strongly 
held by white employers and also form part of the basis of official public 
policy. Indeed, it may be a close approximation to argue that ‘cultural 
theoretic’ interpretation of the economic impact of African culture represent 
the norm of white attitudes. As such it is the conventional wisdom of 
the Rhodesian oligarchy. The comments which follow are intended to apply 
in principle to the ‘cultural theoretic’ model in general.
A CRITIQUE OF THE CULTURAL-THEORETIC MODEL
There are a wide range of questions raised by the assumptions, frame­
work, focus and character of empiricism employed in the application of the 
‘cultural theoretic’ model to Rhodesia. Here only brief reference is made to 
some of the deficiencies of the model as an explanation of Rhodesian under­
development.
Firstly, there are serious definitional problems in the ‘cultural-theoretic’ 
model which some proponents have overlooked. In places it is not clear just 
what is implied by culture and whether or not it is a received socialization 
pattern or something deeper and more immutable. Danckwerts (I) regards 
cultural beliefs as being so rooted and ‘irretrievably woven throughout the 
whole fabric of tribal culture’.'"  In this situation underdevelopment appears 
as an original state, and an aspect of the status quo that cannot readily be 
mitigated, because Africans may not be able to ‘discard the shackles of 
their traditional beliefs’."2 Sadie is less unequivocal but still regards the 
‘breaking of the fetters of tradition (as) a most difficult operation (which) 
may take a long time’.”3 From this premise follows Sadie’s advocacy of 
economic deevlopment through the modern sector, or rather white society, 
‘from (whose) ranks emanates the spirit of enterprise which is the forts et origo 
of economic advancement and the generation of employment opportunities’."4 
Reader, by contrast, argues implicitly that culture is mutable, that dis­
advantages incurred by an individual from his cultural background, ‘dis~ 
qualifying him from competition in (a western industrial milieu) against 
Europeans of comparable formal education’,"5 can be counter-acted through 
appropriate educational inputs. But, as shall be argued below, Reader’s 
arguments on this score invalidly attach what may be a rural peasant culture
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to the individual (African) so competing against his (European) counterpart 
in industrial employment. In other words, the factors being compared are 
not the same and the difference in occupational position and expertise is 
causally attributed to the ‘cultural factor’. The argument thereby assumes 
what has to be demonstrated.
Secondly, there is a tendency not to distinguish various forms and sources 
of discrimination and an attempt is made to define such discrimination in 
culturalist terms. The effect is to shift the focus of analysis and to obscure 
the relationships of cause and effect. For instance, in Danckwerts II a dis­
tinction is drawn between ‘discrimination’ and ‘reasoned differentiation’. A 
reading of the context in which this distinction is drawn leads this observer 
to see no such distinction, except insofar as Danckwerts is legitimately 
making reference to the employer’s response to a discriminatory environment 
in which discrimination arises from various sources, viz., consumers, 
employees, government and unions. In positivist terms, the effect, i.e., dis­
crimination, is the same and only the source differs. It may be a critical 
observation to record, as Lester Thurow and Gary Becker have pointed out, 
but it is discrimination nonetheless."6 Equally pertinent is the fact that dis­
crimination may take various forms, e.g., in wage structure, in internal labour 
markets, in hiring and firing policies, in investment policies, etc. For a full 
understanding of the process of discrimination in the context of under­
development, a broad approach is required and a consideration of the 
economic theory of discrimination and underdevelopment is of fundamental 
importance. In general, the culturalist school pay minimal attention, if any, 
to these theses and the crisis in their development model can largely be traced 
to this inadequacy. Thus, when Reader notes that ‘the employer who decides 
to take the cultural risk and employ educated or trained Africans at senior 
and responsible levels’"7 has problems (e.g. the official requirements to estab­
lish separate toilet facilities, white consumer discrimination and white 
employee discrimination), the argument is really nothing to do with ‘cultural 
risk’ per se, whatever that may be. Rather, it is rational profit maximizing 
behaviour by employers within a discriminatory environment and the 
employer response is an expression of this discrimination. The latter, it is 
submitted, is a more adequate theoretical and empirical representation of 
reality than the mystification that is perpetrated by use of an inadequate and 
inappropriate framework.
Thirdly, in some culturalist theorizing there is an implicit assumption 
made that technology is ‘culture-bound’. Certainly this is a strong assumption 
in Danckwerts I where the latter goes even further to argue that development 
is a function solely of the rate of technological advancement. Clearly, 
economists would regard this conception as far too narrow a production 
function to apply to underdeveloped countries. And whilst it may be accepted 
that technology is part of culture, it is also universal, transferable, adaptable 
and, in today’s world, cannot be regarded as being restricted by cultural 
boundaries."0 It is not altogether clear exactly the Reader assumption is on 
the universality or otherwise of technology, but in any event, even if the 
Reader typology of African-European cultural values assumed that technology 
could be diffused, the cultural theoretic model applied by the latter to the 
area of Black-White competition in the Rhodesian labour market implicitly 
assumes that the Black worker is bound by the cultural type and technological
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capabilities of a stereotyped rural African peasantry."9 This comparison, it 
is argued here, cannot be legitimately upheld: which brings this critique to a 
fourth observation.
A basic flaw can be noted in the application of the cultural-theoretical 
model as applied to competing groups in the market-place. As has been 
argued elsewhere, 120 the Reader typology may even be correct as a represen­
tation of the culture of African peasantry and of Europeans in a ‘western 
industrial milieu’. The model is only useful, however, as a causal explanation 
of African underdevelopment, if certain conditions can be satisfied and 
demonstrated.
Firstly, the cultural typology must be representative and relevant to the 
two groups of competing workers. This note would submit that the Reader 
typology is fundamentally in error on this score when, applied to the 
Rhodesian labour market.12' The extreme polarity of a rural peasant cultural- 
type cannot be regarded as an adequate description of the cultural milieu 
of an urbanized, industrialized, unionized Black proletariat. Additionally, 
there is reason to suspect that the cultural values set down as applicable to 
‘Europeans’ are also representative of a polarity within white society.
The second necessary condition pertains to the need to demonstrate a 
casual link between the cultural traits of, let us say, group X and that 
group’s occupational position,'2* mobility, opportunity-cost and productivity, 
etc. It is one thing to note an association between two factors: it is quite 
another inference to record a casual relationship between them as well as to 
express certitude about the direction of that link. Casual relationships need 
to be theoretically as well as empirically demonstrated. At this point the 
cultural-theoretic model breaks down almost entirely. As Higgins has recorded 
in his critique of Boeke, the theory of cultural dualism looks ‘in the wrong 
place for (an) explanation of dualism’.123 There is adequate evidence of a 
similar shortcoming in the application of the cultural theoretic model to 
Rhodesia. A number of problems can be identified in this regard. For instance, 
many cultural traits are specified in such a fashion as to beg the question by 
assuming what has to be proven. What exactly is an ‘agricultural time-sense’? 
And what degree of conceptual and empirical elasticity is required for analyists 
to accept that this is a typical trait of the Black worker who is competing 
directly with Whites? Even if it did exist as a demonstrable cultural trait of 
Black industrial labour, insofar as this group retains and maintains rural 
links and rural investments, is it not simply a case of incomplete prolet­
arianization forced upon the labourer by the economic structure which pays 
his below poverty datum level wages and so requires him to retain two 
homesteads and seek ultimate security in the rural area?124 Indeed, evidence 
from a number of sources records a rapid stabilization of the Black pro­
letariat in Rhodesia.123 Similarly, we are told by the cultural theorists that 
‘communal attitudes to property’ confer a disadvantage on Blacks competing 
in a modern industrial environment. The representativeness and casual link 
of this hypothesis have not been demonstrated. And, indeed, the degree of 
income inequality that exists within the Black proletariat at least provides 
a priori evidence on the relative irrelevance of communal attitudes to com­
petitive capacity in the labour market. Intra-family rural-urban income 
transfers cannot be taken in this regard as proof of communalist and non- 
individualistic behaviour. They are more appropriately regarded as long-term
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welfare maximizing policies adopted by individual workers who must rely 
on rural links as a substitute for low wages and inadequate pension provisions 
in the urban economy. Finally, another weakness of the empirical approach 
of cultural-theoretic models is their tendency, at least when applied in Rho­
desia, to be based on invalid comparisons. For instance, Danckwerts records 
that ‘On the grounds of commonsense it seems reasonable to conclude that 
levels of income in each sector (Black peasant and White plantation economies 
respectively) are a reflection of different levels of technological attainment’.'26 
In part this is true. But it is nowhere near a sufficient and holistic explanation 
of differences in the economic structures and income receipts of these two 
economy-types. Danckwerts’ identification of this differential as a simple 
technological (and in his terms cultural) gap is fundamentally erroneous. 
It ignores land policies, land distribution, the spatial significance of the Land 
Tenure Act, the scale of production, the differential public sector investments 
in the two sectors, the structure of capital subsidies and fiscal incentives. 
Put simply, Danckwerts has not standardized the two sectors (factors) being 
compared and his results are biased accordingly. What is explained as a 
differential that is culturally determined can be far more adequately explained 
by reference to economic phenomena. This lack of empiricism is not confined 
to Danckwerts’ model but may also be found in Sadie.127
Fifthly, without going into detail, some of the general propositions of 
the Boeke-type model applied to Rhodesia by Danckwerts, Sadie and Reader 
may be criticized for their theoretical weakness, in a similar fashion to the 
critique applied by Higgins to Boeke. The empirical data to support culturalist 
propositions in Rhodesian circumstances is also weak. Peasants in the Tribal 
Trust Lands do not, from all available evidence, have ‘limited wants’. Their 
behaviour, as evidenced in migrancy and an appreciation of their opportunity- 
cost in plantation labour, the urban informal sector and in formal urban 
employment, is strongly representative of maximizing behaviour, albeit a mix 
between security and incomes.128 Even historically, the thesis of the ‘delayed 
response’ of peasant society to the economic demands of capitalism has been 
shown to be of little substance by both economists and historians.129 Sadie’s 
speculations, for they are little more than this since they are not based on 
any relevant empirical inquiry, concerning the lack of entrepreneurial 
initiative and the cultural restraints on Black capitalism, do not accord with 
the facts of the situation. African business does function under restraint, but 
not simply under cultural restraint. More important structural factors account 
for the character of black business in Rhodesia, both in the formal and 
informal sectors.130
Sixthly, the most important deficiency of the cultural-theoretic model 
is its failure to appropriately specify the economy-type and mode of produc­
tions within which economic competition takes place. Cultural theorists, in 
recognizing that the Rhodesian economy is structured along the lines of 
capitalism, partly controlled and directed by an internal racial obligarchy, 
have failed to specify that the economy-type is an underdeveloped one subject 
to significant foreign investment interests, particularly from South African 
multi-national corporations. By concentrating on ‘cultural factors’, the model 
attempts to explain away two important development processes that charac­
terize Rhodesian economic experience: the pursuit of discrimination as a 
means to ends set and dictated by the centre; and, the historical process of 
underdevelopment in the peasant economy. The ‘cultural theoretic’ model
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is not able to adequately address itself to these two crucial historical processes 
and therefore fails as a critical model of underdevelopment applicable to 
Rhodesia. The cultural theoretic model is not only ahistorical in its approach 
but also has little reference to economic structure and the mode and objec­
tives of production and distribution in Rhodesia. It glosses over the nature 
of decision-taking within the economy in the setting of macro-economic 
relationships and opportunities and in designing a framework and policy 
within which the (implicit) planning objectives of policy-makers are pursued. 
The cultural-theoretical model has ignored the real determinants of under­
development, growth and income distribution in Rhodesia.
In labour markets, it ignores government policy; the character of indus­
trial relations; the structure of legislation; the procedures and practices of 
collective bargaining; the function and nature of unionism; monopsony; the 
‘traditional’ wage policies pursued in the plantation economy; and the price, 
incomes and distribution policies of the private and public sector.
In capital markets, the culturalists ignore the structure of the Land 
Tenure Act and the associated implications thereof; the monopolistic charac­
ter of production; the dominance of white institutional influences; the 
collusive links between white capitalism and the white controlled government; 
the role of foreign capital in the primary sector and the structure of capital 
subsidies (implicit labour taxes) that underwrite large scale enterprises.
In respect of the peasant economy, culturalist theory has failed to explain 
and coherently analyse the process of underdevelopment of the peasant 
economy in Rhodesia. More specifically, it ignores the whole history of land 
alienation; differential product pricing by (racial) producer group; differential 
public sector investment policies towards the peasant economy and the 
centre’s sponsorship of a competitive plantation economic system; the distri­
bution of drought-aid disbursements; the character of research and develop­
ment in the centre to the detriment of the welfare of the periphery; the effect 
of a regressive tax structure on peasant producers; and the detrimental effects 
of the contract and foreign labour system over the last 75 years in under­
mining the supply price of ‘necessary’ peasant labour exports to the centre. 
Additional points could be raised but it is argued that sufficient indications 
are given here to demonstrate the structural weakness of the cultural theoretic 
model.
A final observation may be made which is closely related to the above 
discussion. Whilst here it is being argued that economic factors are of 
significance in explaining underdevelopment, it is also worth raising the 
question of the factors which actually determine cultural type. In the Reader 
typology of cultural variation between ‘Africans’ and ‘Europeans’, a more 
accurate specification pertains to the categories ‘peasant (rural African)’ and 
‘high income group (urban white)’. This alternative classification throws into 
sharper relief the significance of economic factors in shaping culture-type and 
further undermines the relevance of the cultural theoretical model as a causal 
explanation of underdevelopment.
THE ORIGINS OF A THEORETICAL CRISIS
In development theory, the culturalist model has been largely rejected 
by the bulk of scholars.'31 Despite these theoretical developments and the 
strong trend in development economics to re-structure dualistic theory in
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‘non-culturalist’ terms, at least since Lewis’ seminal contribution in 1954,132 
as well as the gradual rejection of the economic model of dualism by a 
growing number of scholars, and in addition the substantial critique of 
classical dualism (a la Barber) as applied to Rhodesia,133 the model persists 
in its appeal to some Rhodesian academics. However, the later group of 
analysts have consistently failed to respond to the empirical and theoretical 
critique against the model which they rely upon. Indeed, the real crisis in the 
cultural theoretic model is its divergence from observed reality and its 
increasing theoretical inadequacy.
The cultural-theoretic model in its professionalized form has a long 
(populist) history in Rhodesian ideology. The origins of its crisis of inadequacy 
stem from its failure to address itself to the significant variables in the 
situation and to ignore structural factors. Discrimination is ignored to the 
point of absurdity, yet it is clearly one of the most prominent features of 
Rhodesian social, political and economic life. The process of class formation 
and stratification in both black and white society is left unexplained in terms 
of culturalist theses. This theory is still in the realm of analyses of thet 
African, with the European thrown in for good measure. No connectedness is 
made between poverty and affluence — they are assumed unrelated and are 
regarded as almost entirely determined by cultural factors, a ‘magic box’ of 
similar design to the ‘market mentality’ which ignores the institutional 
structure. Indeed, cultural theorists proceed as if society operated in an 
institutional vacuum. There is no role for government. Instead it is ignored, 
implicitly assuming that it has a neutralist impact on development and 
underdevelopment.
The real role served by the professionalization of ideology in abstract, 
theoretical terms must be sought in its function of legitimating the social 
order to which it relates. This is no more and no less true of culturalist 
theory in Rhodesia which has made, and is attempting to make, the cruder 
forms of populist ideology about black economic propensities more acceptable 
to the intellectual and the political elite.
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